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ABSTRACT 
The present study aims at determining the short-term wealth effects of cross-
border acquisitions (CBA) launched by European bidders between 2001 and 2010. It 
contributes to previous research on European CBA by focusing on the wealth gains of 
not only target shareholders but also bidder and combined firms shareholders. 
Additionally, it extends existing literature on the wealth effects of acquisitions by 
providing an insight of the European CBA recently launched. Using a sample of 114 
completed European deals, an analysis of the cumulative average abnormal returns of 
all involving shareholders and the distribution between them is carried out. The number 
of completed acquisitions of European firms is similar to those acquisitions of non-
European firms and the number of all-cash and friendly acquisitions clearly surpasses 
the number of all-equity or mixed and hostile acquisitions, respectively. Based on event 
study methodology the results show that target shareholders always gain from the offer. 
On the other hand, our results suggest that bidder shareholders lose wealth around 
announcement day. Notwithstanding bidder shares performance, our results evidence a 
positive combined wealth effect of cross-border deals suggesting that the target gains 
offset bidder losses. However this positive combined performance does not occur in the 
following situations: (i) acquisitions of non-European targets; (ii) acquisitions that 
occurred after the beginning of the financial crisis; (iii) acquisitions between firms in 
different business sectors, and (iv) acquisitions by relatively large bidders. A cross-
sectional analysis has been performed and the results suggest that the relative size and 
the level of investor protection in the target firm country have an impact on bidder 
shares performance around announcement date. Concerning to the target shareholders 
the results suggest that the relative exchange rate and the level of investor protection 
explain targets CAR. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Research on mergers and acquisitions (hereinafter “M&A”) generically 
addresses corporate transactions, such as mergers, takeovers (including friendly and 
tender-offers), assets acquisitions and buyouts. Such corporate deals can be understood 
as investment plans carried out in order to achieve strategic goals and generate value to 
the firm. M&A goals are broadly associated to cost savings and revenue enhancement 
(Sudarsanam, 2004) but it is the assessment of value generation that can state whether 
those goals have been achieved. 
The study of value generation of M&A requires attention to some key points. 
First of all, it is necessary to define how to measure value creation. Then, one should 
bare in mind that the conclusions of the acquisitions wealth effects on the bidder shares 
are much more ambiguous than those on the target shares. Third, the time span of 
analysis shall be taken into consideration when interpreting the final results. A short-
term analysis and a long-term analysis around announcement may lead to different 
conclusions on the effects of the acquisition.  
Prior literature suggests that indeed in some cases M&A create value, however 
this value creation is dependent on a set of variables such as the means of payment 
(Servaes, 1991; Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012), bid attitude (Bhagat et al., 2005), 
industry relatedness between involving firms (Danbolt, 2004), relative size (Jarrel and 
Poulsen, 1989; Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983; Moeller et al., 2004), geographical 
scope (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Rossi and Volpi, 2004), exchange rates (Froot 
and Stein, 1991; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Cebenoyan et al., 1992), the level of 
development of the firms countries (Doukas and Travlos, 1988) and market regulation 
(Bris et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2009). 
In addition, historical data illustrates that until the 90`s, M&A usually occurred 
under national boundaries. Globalization and markets regulations contributed to the 
emergence of a larger number of cross-border deals (Coeurdacier, 2009). The recent 
transnational pattern of M&A highlights the differences between cross-border 
acquisitions (“CBA”) and domestic acquisitions, in terms of risk and sources of value. 
In Europe the number of CBA has improved significantly after 1992, first as result of 
the implementation of the single market and then from 1999 onwards with the 
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implementation of a single currency (the Euro). Although CBA have increased over the 
recent years, either in volume as in number, there are several questions that remain 
unanswered.  
Most of prior investigation is based on US and UK firms, so it turns it would be 
interesting to improve existing empirical evidence on the European market for corporate 
control. Also, prior evidence on CBA is mostly focused on transactions over the 90`s, 
and on the gains of target firms (Danbolt, 2004; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; 
Cebenoyan et al., 1992) whereas evidence of bidders and combined wealth effects is 
scarce.   
The empirical study of foreign transactions presents some constraints, namely in 
terms of statistical analysis and the set of additional variables that may explain the 
performance of CBA. The relative lack of research about CBA leads every new research 
a step ahead in terms of comprehension of these complex operations. 
For all the above mentioned, the first goal of this study is to assess whether CBA 
undertook by European bidders between 2001 and 2010 generated value or not. Our 
intentions are to provide a better understanding of the effects of the cross-border bids on 
the abnormal returns of bidders, targets and combined firms shareholders around 
announcement date.  
In order to achieve these goals the analysis has focused on short-term cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) around announcement day. A standard event study of CAR in 
several day windows around announcement day has been performed. The sample has 
been split according to a set of variables that might impact shareholders gains such as: i) 
target origin region, ii) period of bid announcement, iii) industry relatedness and iv) 
relative size. After a preliminary insight of some factors that may affect the 
performance of bidder and target shares, a cross-sectional analysis with cross-border 
variables (exchange rate, country development status and level of investor protection) 
along with variables related with bid characteristics (means of payment, relative size, 
industry relatedness and bid attitude) has been carried out in order to determine the 
relevant variables that have an impact on those shareholders gains.  
To our best knowledge, so far none of the existing studies on European CBA has 
addressed these issues. 
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 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview of European M&A 
Literature focused on European M&A is not as robust as when it comes to 
transactions in the US market. Prior research on European M&A is mostly focused in 
the 90`s and includes mainly deals between firms from different European countries 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Danbolt, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011).  
The European M&A used to have a smaller dimension than US peer, either in 
volume as in number of deals. Until the 90`s the European industry profile was 
dominated by small and medium firms used to do business in domestic markets. The 
strategy of European firms then changed substantially, in part, due to abolishment of 
trade barriers and the establishment of the Euro-zone. It started with the single market 
implementation in 1992 and it was enhanced until 1999 with the European Monetary 
Union (“EMU”) where the Euro-Zone countries share the same currency and have a 
common monetary policy. In the European Union, trade agreements towards free flow 
of goods, economic and monetary policy integration as well as convergence in terms of 
products regulation and fiscal agreements between member-states have contributed to 
increase M&A activity (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). The reorganization of the European 
trade policy has encouraged firms to conquer new markets abroad (Campa and 
Hernando, 2004). 
 A firm decision on capital allocation across countries carries important sources 
of risk, namely political, fiscal, exchange rate, cultural, that were, in part, diluted with 
the EMU, and thus have stimulated foreign investment by European firms. As a 
consequence of the European market integration there were a lot of industry 
privatizations in the 90’s and a part of them were, in fact, CBA within member-states. 
Furthermore, convergence in terms of consumer tastes and market organization (for 
instance, in this period we observed the consolidation of the European bank industry) 
have also contributed to promote CBA.  
The increase of European M&A has demanded a new era of European regulation 
for corporate takeovers (Goergen et al., 2005). After years of working on an attempt to 
build a harmonized European law applied to the market of corporate control, it was in 
2004 that the European Commission established the Takeover Directive. The Takeover 
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Directive is based on the following general principles that shall be transposed by all 
Member-States to their national legislation: (i) mandatory bid-rule1; (ii) principle of 
equal treatment of shareholders2; (iii) squeeze-out right and sell-out right3; (iv) 
prohibition of market manipulation or abuse and; (v) the shareholders must have 
sufficient time and information to make a properly informed decision on the bid.  
 
2.1.1 Abnormal Returns in M&A 
The analysis of the wealth gains of M&A is usually based on the abnormal 
returns on shares measured as the difference between effective returns and expected 
returns (Asquith et al., 1983). This incremental share price measures the M&A effect. 
Also, the share price changes around bid announcement highlight market reaction to 
expectations of future cash flows of firms involved in M&A.  
Overall, empirical evidence provides support either to positive (albeit in same 
cases very small) abnormal returns on targets shares (Lang et al., 1989; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004; Franks et al., 1991; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Asquith et al., 
1983; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Moeller et al., 2004; Moeller et al., 2005) or to 
negative abnormal returns on bidders shares (Servaes, 1991; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 
2003; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006) as well as to positive combined abnormal returns 
(Bradley et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991; Campa and Hernando, 2004).  
Prior evidence shows that bidders do not always benefit from wealth creation of 
the acquisition. In fact, the bid announcement effect in the shares of bidders is puzzling 
even today, because in cases that M&A reduce the value of the shares of bidders, 
shareholders would be better without the transaction. For instance, Sudarsanam (2004) 
shows that bidders experience negative returns in the short-term period after the offer 
announcement, suggesting that those firms that entered into acquisitions have 
                                                     
1
 Mandatory bid rule establishes that an investors that gains control of a firm, extends the offer to 
remaining shareholders at a fair price. 
2
 Principal of equal treatment of shareholders establishes that shareholders rights are proportional to the 
shares they hold at the firm. 
3
 Squeeze-out right states that a shareholder that launched a bid that allowed to hold not less than 90% of 
firm capital and voting rights has the right to buy the remaining capital shares at a fair price. 
Sell-out right states that minority shareholders have the right to sell their shares to a majority shareholder 
in case of change of control.    
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underperformed. However Jarrel and Poulsen (1989) as well as Dodd and Ruback 
(1977) report statistically significant positive abnormal returns to bidders shareholders.  
The analysis of the performance of the shares of bidders deserves additional 
attention because bidder firms may be involved in acquisitions program for a long time 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983) that not always is understood by the market. In case of 
multiple bids the analysis of bidder returns should consider the total number of offers 
launched and not just a single offer, otherwise the interpretation of bidder share price 
variation may not be complete. 
Moreover, the combined wealth effect is also ambiguous among previous 
research. Roll (1986) suggests that there is a transfer of returns from bidders to targets 
firms. Servaes (1991) also suggests that targets gains are at cost of bidders losses but 
Limmack (1991), for instance, does not conclude on a wealth transfer from bidders 
shareholders to targets.  
To sum up, one thing that seems to gather consensus among previous research is 
that around the announcement date abnormal returns earned by target firm shareholders 
are positive and much larger than those of bidder shareholders (Jarrel and Poulsen, 
1989; Limmack, 1991). 
 
2.2 Overview of Cross-Border M&A 
Cross-border acquisitions account for a great part of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in developed countries. After the 80’s, research on CBA has increased because of 
the growing magnitude of international trade and capital flows. According to 
UNCTAD4 data, the number of CBA deals has increased steadily (see Figure 1) over the 
last two decades. In the 90’s there were 27,283 CBA. From 1998 to 2000 there were 
11,283 CBA deals which represented 41% of total CBA deals launched between 1990 
and 2000. In the following decade there were 29,177 CBA deals, 4% more than the 
previous decade.  
UNCTAD data also shows that there was a higher volume and number of CBA 
deals in Europe than in the US (see Figures 1 and 2). The larger dimension of US 
domestic market allows firms to grow within national boundaries, whereas in Europe, 
                                                     
4
  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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each country has its singularities. Only after the monetary policy harmonization in 1992 
conditions were created to generate a wave of acquisitions between firms from different 
European countries.  
 
Figure 1 - Number of Cross-Border Deals by Region of Target Firm 
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Moreover, from 1997 to 2001 and then from 2005 to 2009 there is a large gap in 
terms of transaction volume between CBA undertook by European and US firms (see 
Figure 2). 
Prior literature suggests that factors such as differences in law, stronger investor 
protection and better accounting standards may contribute to the higher volume of CBA 
in certain countries. Additionally, the likelihood of acquiring a firm from a nearby 
country is also higher than a firm from a farther country (Erel et al., 2012). Also, hostile 
bids are more likely to occur in countries with higher investor protection and firms from 
countries with weaker investor protection are more likely targets in CBA (Rossi and 
Volpi, 2004). On the other hand, bidders often choose to cross-list in target firms 
country first and then place the offer on. Therefore Tolmunen and Tostila (2005) 
suggest that European cross-listed firms in US stock markets are more likely to go for a 
CBA than non-cross listed European firms. Cross-listing is also found to be part of 
internationalization process of a firm as well as play the role of means of exchange. It 
may work as the M&A currency because in equity bids, target firm shareholders prefer 
to be paid with domestic shares rather than foreign shares because of taxes, regulatory 
framework and quality of investor protection, among other reasons.  
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Figure 2 – Value of Cross-Border M&A Acquisitions by Region of Target Firm 
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Volume of cross-border deals in $US million. The graph on the top shows evolution of volume of cross-
border deals, per country of target firm in $US millions from 1990 to 1999. The graph on the bottom 
shows evolution of volume of cross-border deals, per country of target firm in $US millions from 2000 to 
2010. 
  
In terms of industry focus, CBA often occur between firms operating in R&D 
intensive industries and between firms in related industries, hence supporting the 
hypothesis of imperfections in markets of goods and factors (Harris and Ravenscraft, 
1991). 
 
2.2.1 Abnormal Returns in Cross-Border M&A 
Empirical evidence on CBA wealth creation is not abundant. Moreover, most 
studies address the bid effect on bidder shareholders (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; 
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Doukas and Travlos, 1988) or target shareholders (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) but 
not often provide data of combined returns. 
Prior research on CBA shows that, on average,  target firms experience positive 
significant abnormal returns on bid announcement day and post-bid period (Danbolt, 
2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004), and also suggest that bidders tend to gain from 
CBA around announcement (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011; Bhagat et al., 2011). For instance, regarding the European market, 
findings from Martynova and Renneboog (2011) show that in CBA launched by firms 
from Continental Europe and UK, both bidders and targets shareholders earn positive 
abnormal returns around the announcement day, though the gains of bidders are lower 
than those of targets. Consistent with previous results, Bhagat et al. (2011) analyzed a 
sample of CBA undertook by bidders located in emerging countries and their results 
confirm positive market reaction on announcement day, materialized in a cumulative 
average abnormal return of 1.09% on the shares of bidders.  
Notwithstanding previous general findings, the analysis of CBA performance is 
not so clear and depends on a set of other variables. For instances, the work of Doukas 
and Travlos (1988) reports that acquisition announcement by US multinational firms 
with no operations in the target firm country has positive effect on bidder shares.  Their 
findings are consistent with the theory of multinational firms that states that 
internationalization plans are implemented only if they generate value for the firm. 
However, in cases where US firms already have operations in target firm country, the 
acquisition has not led to gains to bidder shareholders. Furthermore, the research of Eun 
et al. (1996) holds that CBA generate positive gains for target firms but the effect on the 
gains of bidders depends on the capacity to internalize activities of target firms.  
 
2.2.2 Abnormal Returns in Domestic and Cross-Border M&A  
Most CBA studies focus on comparisons with domestic acquisitions.   
Previous empirical evidence shows that targets tend to earn higher abnormal 
returns in CBA than in domestic bids around announcement (Harris and Ravenscraft, 
1991; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2004; Danbolt, 2004). 
However the recent study of European M&A lead by of Martynova and Renneboog 
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(2011) shows the opposite, i.e., targets shareholders present higher gains in domestic 
bids rather than in cross-border bids.  
General theory of FDI predicts that bidders launch cross-border offers to take 
advantage of market imperfections and thus generate more value to the firm. On the 
other hand, bidders are expected to pay higher premiums in cross-border deals than in 
domestic deals because they have to launch attractive offer prices in order to acquire 
target shares and the lack of knowledge and uncertainty about a firm from a foreign 
country turns it more difficult to be aware of target value.  
Prior empirical evidence of Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011) has not confirmed a negative effect of the cross-border bid over the 
bidders wealth. These authors have found positive abnormal returns on bidder shares, 
although Martynova and Renneboog (2011) find them to be lower in cross-border 
acquisitions than in domestic acquisitions. Their results suggest that market has 
anticipated some constrains that could arise from integration process during post-
acquisition period.  
For the reasons above mentioned, the combined wealth effect is also expected to 
be higher in cross-border than in domestic deals. However, Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) find statistically significant negative combined cross-border effect of -0.866% 
(measured as the difference between abnormal returns in transnational bids and 
domestic bids) in European transactions. In addition, evidence from Campa and 
Hernando (2004) also reports higher combined wealth creation in domestic deals.  
Difficulty on valuating foreign firms due to different accounting standards, 
exchange rate fluctuations, cultural disparities and other factors may contribute to 
enlarge valuation errors in CBA (Danbolt, 2004).  
Literature suggests that the premium paid by bidders depends on specific 
features of the target country such as corporate governance regimes, ownership 
concentration, takeover regulation or information transparency. Rossi and Volpi (2004) 
show that bid premiums are higher in CBA wherein target firms are located in countries 
with stronger investor protection and that the higher the investor protection of the target 
firm country, the less likely all-cash bids are. If there is a stronger level of investors 
protection in the target country, the chance of an unsuccessful bid increases, which 
makes cash transactions to be avoided and encourages bidders to pay higher premiums. 
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Managerial goals may, as well, justify the managers decision of overpaying for 
corporate acquisitions (Eun et al., 1996) and in case of CBA the stimulus to pay a larger 
premium is higher.  
 
2.3 Value Drivers of Abnormal Returns 
Previous studies on the sources of value creation identify a set of factors that 
affect the profitability of acquisitions. Some of these sources are related to general bid 
characteristics, others are specific to CBA.  
 
2.3.1 Cross-Border Characteristics 
Prior research suggests that the performance of CBA depends on a set of factors, 
namely the exchange rate movements, the countries development status and the level of 
investor protection. 
CBA characteristics related with law, accounting standards, corporate 
governance systems, economic environment, cultural differences, fiscal policy, 
information transparency and investor protection, among others, require a complex 
analysis of their effects. The decision for a transnational bid shall bare in mind these 
differences and the way to minimize the negative effects that may arise on the post-
acquisition period. Only through an integrated management approach can CBA surpass 
these obstacles and generate value. 
 
2.3.1.1 Exchange Rate 
Previous literature suggests that exchange rates not only pursue the choice for 
CBA instead of domestic deals, but also have an impact on abnormal returns from CBA. 
Erel et al. (2012) document that currency movements influences the option to 
launch a cross-border bid, especially when involved firms are from geographically close 
countries or when bidders are from wealthier countries than targets. Moreover, bidder 
firms located in countries with relative stronger currencies tend to purchase firms in 
countries with weaker currencies in order to pay smaller premiums than bidders from 
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countries with relatively weaker currencies (Tolmunen and Tostila, 2005). Bidders that 
acquire a firm from a country with relative weaker currency become more competitive 
than domestic bidders (Froot and Stein, 1991).  
Literature suggests that the strength of the bidder home currency explains part of 
its gains because the risk associated with information asymmetry may be, in part, 
surpassed by the relative exchange rate effect, thus contributing to the improvement of 
the bidder shares performance (Froot and Stein, 1991).  
Consistent with this argument, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Cebenoyan et 
al. (1992) find statistical significant effect of the exchange rate on the gains of target 
firms in acquisitions where the bidders currency is relative stronger than targets 
currency. Their results show that CBA generate more gains to target shareholders when 
the bidders currency is stronger than targets` currency. However the work of Eun et al. 
(1996) and Danbolt (2004) suggest that the exchange rate has no effect over bidder, 
target and combined abnormal returns around announcement.  
 
2.3.1.2 Country Development Status 
Prior research has identified the level of economic development of a country as a 
factor that may influence the performance of CBA. Literature suggests that the bidders 
profitability is higher when targets are from less developed countries than bidders.  
Doukas and Travlos (1988) find evidence to support this hypothesis. They find a 
positive relation between US multinational bidders expanding abroad with no operation 
in target country and bidders gains around announcement. The positive effect on the 
bidders gains is stimulated by positive market expectations about the set of 
opportunities that become available in the new market to those US firms. 
Erel et al. (2012) suggest that the country development status is related to the 
quality of accounting standards. Countries with high level of development are 
associated with better quality accounting standards regimes as well as a sophisticated 
level of corporate governance regime. Bidders from countries with relative higher 
development status have greater chance to earn abnormal returns because CBA increase 
the quality of accounting standards of target firms thus improving the post-acquisition 
performance.   
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2.3.1.3 Level of Investor Protection 
Investor protection is provided by the commercial code or corporate law valid in 
the country of origin of the firm. CBA to target firms in countries with strong level of 
investor protection have more difficulties on passing without prior market notice before 
the announcement. A set of regulatory demands turns the bid more predictable.  
As such, target firms from countries with stronger investor protection are found 
to earn larger abnormal returns (Bris et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998; Anderson et al., 
2009) and bidders to pay higher premiums to prevent from competitive bids (Bebchuk, 
2005). In addition, CBA wherein bidders are from countries with above-median 
shareholder protection and targets are from countries with low-median shareholder 
protection, have positive significant combined abnormal returns at announcement. 
When the opposite verifies, that is to say, targets are from high-median protection 
countries and bidders are from low-median protection countries, CBA have significant 
negative combined abnormal returns (Bris et al., 2008). 
Other studies show that countries with stronger shareholder protection present 
larger M&A activity and firms located in countries with weaker investor protection are 
generally acquired by firms from countries with stronger one (Rossi and Volpin, 2004).  
 
2.3.2 Bid Characteristics  
Prior literature has shed light on the impact of bid characteristics in M&A gains, 
in particular, those of targets and bidders shareholders. Factors such as means of 
payment (cash, equity, mixed), bid attitude (friendly, hostile), firms relative size and 
industry relatedness are hypothesised to influence wealth creation of M&A. 
 
2.3.2.1 Means of Payment 
Prior empirical evidence shows that cash offers usually lead to gains not only to 
targets shareholders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) but also to bidders’ (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2011) while equity exchange offers have negative effect on the bidders 
wealth (Franks et al., 1991). Consequently, cash offers are suggested to have positive 
combined wealth effect (Servaes, 1991).  
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The explanation is that cash offers deserve more reflection from bidders’ 
management since it is hard for a firm manager that has cashed in to spend the money in 
unprofitable businesses. Moreover, the means of exchange of the offer may be a market 
sign of bidder shares value. The underlying idea is that in periods of high equity market 
valuations and information asymmetry, bidders managers that think the firms share are 
overvalued prefer to exchange them in M&A, instead of paying the offer with cash. 
The hypothesis of means of payment is confirmed in the works of Servaes 
(1991) and Martynova and Renneboog (2011) that suggest cash bids to provide positive 
abnormal returns to targets and moderate abnormal positive returns to bidders.  
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show that target shareholders present larger 
gains in all-cash offers and their abnormal returns are indeed sensitive to the means of 
payment, albeit they do not find evidence consistent with this hypothesis when it comes 
to bidders. The authors find that bidder shareholders report statistically significant 
larger gains in all-equity bids than in all-cash bids suggesting that means of payment do 
not act as a market sign of under or overvaluation of bidder shares. Furthermore in case 
of high uncertainty around the target firm value, bidders may prefer the stock exchange 
payment, instead of cash, in order to prevent the negative consequences from 
information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry is hence, one of the causes highlighted to the use of 
earnouts as part of the payment. The use of earnouts allows reducing the risk from 
information asymmetry since a part of the price is contingent to some events and so 
limits the adverse selection problem. As such the means of payment may contribute to 
risk diversification in M&A, thus improving the bidder shares performance in relation 
to transactions where there are no earnouts (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) suggest that the higher the proportion of price paid 
as earnouts, the better the bidders performance in post-acquisition period.  
To the extent that targets valuation is more complex in CBA we would expect 
bidders to prefer equity bids. However, the means of payment in CBA is dictated by the 
preference of target shareholders for cash, instead of foreign equity.  
Not consistent with previous evidence some studies do not find significant 
abnormal returns for bidder shares nor for targets attending hypothesis of means of 
exchange (Leeth and Borg, 2000; Bhagat et al., 2005).  
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Finally, some authors have studied the relation between the means of payment of 
M&A and the firms’ size concluding that cash bids are more likely to occur when they 
involve small targets (Goergen et al., 2004) 
 
2.3.2.2 Bid Attitude 
Bid attitude hypothesis suggests that hostile takeovers are more profitable than 
friendly acquisitions. A possible explanation is the market expectation that the impact of 
bidder management on target firm is higher in hostile than in friendly bids, thus 
resulting in larger value creation (Bhagat et al., 2005).  
Prior empirical evidence supports larger positive abnormal returns to target 
shares in hostile rather than in friendly bids around announcement day (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011; Servaes, 1991).  
Concerning to bidders performance, prior empirical evidence is not consistent 
with the theoretical bid attitude framework. Bhagat et al. (2005) show that bidders of 
friendly M&A outperform bidders of hostile ones. Consistent with their findings, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) also find negative abnormal returns for bidders in 
hostile European bids whereas positive abnormal returns in friendly bids in short-term 
windows around announcement day. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) confirm that in 
long event windows post announcement period bidders also experience negative 
abnormal returns in hostile bids.  
Rossi and Volpi (2004) study the likelihood to launch a hostile bid and their 
results show that hostile bids are more likely to occur in countries with stronger 
shareholders protection. 
 
2.3.2.3 Industry Relatedness 
M&A can be driven by focus or diversification strategies, whether the offer goes 
for a firm in same or different business sector. The industry hypothesis suggests that 
diversification strategy tend to be less profitable for bidders than focus oriented ones, 
due to lack of knowledge of the new business they are entering into.  
Prior research has shown that target firms tend to experience larger positive 
abnormal returns in M&A driven by diversification rather than focus goals suggesting 
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that bidders overpay for the acquisitions (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Consistent 
with previous evidence, Danbolt (2004) confirms that the industry relatedness between 
firms explains part of targets abnormal returns.  
The research of Martynova and Renneboog (2011) shows that in short event 
windows around announcement focus oriented M&A tend to be more profitable to 
bidder shareholders than diversified ones. Evidence from Agrawal et al. (1992) also 
shows that in the post-acquisition period bidders of acquisitions cross-industry present 
significant higher losses than those in oriented acquisitions. Not consistent with 
previous results Eun et al. (1996) provides evidence that in CBA of US target firms 
operating in different business area, bidders experience higher share price variation 
around announcement than peers that entered into related industry acquisitions.  
Additionally, Doukas and Travlos (1988) suggest that in CBA of bidders 
expanding into new geographical markets the industry relatedness between firms has a 
positive impact in the bidders gains. These authors defend that bidders benefit from 
acquisition when they diversify in terms of industry and geographical market. 
 
2.3.2.4 Relative Size 
Prior studies on M&A performance support the relation between bidders returns 
and target firm relative size, suggesting that the larger the target size, the higher the 
abnormal returns to bidders around announcement (Asquith et al., 1983; Jarrel and 
Poulsen, 1989; Moeller et al., 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). They suggest 
that relative larger bidders overpay in larger scale and the size of premium paid is 
positively related with relative size of the bidder firm (Moeller et al., 2004). 
Large firms tend to have more regulation constrains than small firms which may 
explain evidence of higher abnormal returns on shares of small bidders.  Nonetheless, 
the research of Agrawal et al. (1992) does not confirm that the bidders relative size is a 
statistically significant variable to explain bidders post-acquisition performance (up to 
60 months) in completed mergers. Also, prior research of Asquith et al. (1983) has not 
found evidence of the impact of relative size in target shares performance.  
From a different perspective, Tolmunen and Tostila (2005) and Erel et al. (2012) 
suggest that large firms are more likely to be acquirers in CBA than small firms. 
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3. DATA SOURCES, SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
For the purpose of this study a CBA is a transaction between two firms, each one 
with primary location in different countries. In order to perform the analysis, a sample 
of CBA announced between January 2001 and December 2010, by European bidders, 
has been selected. Our sample was selected using S&P Capital IQ database.  
First, all CBA transactions launched by bidders with primary location in Europe 
over the last decade were collected. The data was then restricted to deals involving 
public firms (bidder and target) at the announcement date. Deals with at least one firm 
operating in the financial industry were excluded due to specificities of this industry in 
terms of accounting information and nature of operations, which has led to 1,641 CBA 
deals.  
Then, 1,186 deals were dropped as they did not involve the acquisition of a 
majority stake. This was due  not only to the fact that, according to Rossi and Volpi 
(2004), the acquisition of a stake below 50% is affected by severally cross-country 
differences in disclosure requirements but also to the combined wealth effect that this 
study is trying to assess  makes sense if bidders gain control over targets with the 
acquisition.  
From the remaining 455 deals only successful deals (closed or effective deals on 
or prior December 2012) were considered. At this stage 87 deals were dropped. Finally, 
for methodology purposes, from the 368 deals only those that, for both bidder and target 
firms, share price were available throughout the 60 month-period before the 
announcement date were kept in our sample.  
Given all these constrains the sample comprises 114 CBA occurred between 
2001 and 2010 where bidder firms are from 18 European countries and target firms are 
from 26 European and non-European countries. For each deal in the sample data, the 
share prices (in domestic currency) and shares outstanding were collected from the 
Reuters Datastream database. The shares price was then converted ton US dollars using 
the historical exchange rate, also collected from Thompson Reuters database. 
Additional information on the offer such as means of payment (cash, equity, mixed), 
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deal attitude (hostile, friendly, friendly to hostile) and industry relatedness were 
collected from S&P Capital IQ database. 
 
3.2 Sample Composition 
3.2.1 Means of Payment, Deal Attitude, Industry Sector and Relative Size  
As expected and consistent to prior evidence from Danbolt (2004) and Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) Table 1 shows that a large part of the sample is represented by 
all-cash deals (86%).  In CBA the offer is more likely to be accepted if it is an all cash-
offers. 
 
Table 1 – Sample Composition 
Nr. of  
Cross-Border  
Bids 
Target Region 
Europe 
United 
States and 
Canada 
Asia / 
Pacific 
Latin 
America 
and 
Caribbean 
Africa / 
Middle 
East 
Total 
Panel A: Means of Payment 
All- Cash 42 45 6 1 4 98 
All- Equity 5 3 - - - 8 
Mixed 4 2 1 - 1 8 
Panel B: Deal Attitude 
Friendly 50 48 7 1 5 111 
Friendly to Hostile - 1 - - - 1 
Hostile 1 1 - - - 2 
Panel C: Industry Sector 
Different 9 13 1 - 1 24 
Same 42 37 6 1 4 90 
Panel D: Relative Size 
Small Bidders 30 17 - - - 47 
Large Bidders 21 33 7 1 5 67 
Total  51 50 7 1 5 114 
Source: Own calculations based on S&P Capital IQ data 
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The sample is also dominated by friendly acquisitions (97%) and of firms from 
the same industry (roughly 79%), suggesting that bidders were not looking for business 
diversification. 
In terms of relative size, in 47 deals (about 41% of total sample) the target 
market capitalization exceeds in more than 10% of bidder market capitalization. The 
relative size was measured six months before announcement following Asquith et al. 
(1983). Therefore, most of the sample deals (59%) comprise relative large bidder firms. 
 
3.2.2 Country of Origin 
Table 2 shows that 55% of European offers in the sample targeted firms from a 
country outside Europe, in particular, from US and Canada (44%). In fact, Europeans 
firms have acquired US and Canadian firms as much as European firms. This bid 
exposure is different from the studies based on the 90 decade where most of the cross-
border acquisitions were intra-European.  
Bidder firms are mainly from the UK (23%), France (17%), Germany (11%) and 
Switzerland (10%) whereas most target firms are located in the US (37%), UK (15%) 
and Canada (7%). Firms from Anglo-Saxon countries are far more active in the market 
for corporate control than Continental European firms, either as target or bidder firms. 
Cultural similarities and historical development of equity markets may justify the 
relevance of these countries.  
Notwithstanding, bidder firms from France and Switzerland are far beyond the 
most active Continental European firms with predominance to make cross-border 
acquisitions outside Europe. On the contrary, bidder firms from German and 
Netherlands are more focused in cross-country acquisitions within the European market. 
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Table 2– Number of Cross-Border M&A by Bidder and Target Country of Origin 
 Bidders 
Targets FIN FRA GER IRE ITA NET SPA SWE SWI UK OEC Total 
AUS - - - - - - - - - 4 - 4 
CAN - 1 1 - 1 - - 1 1 3 - 8 
FRA - - 1 - 1 1 - - - 2 - 5 
NET - 1 - - - - - 1 - 1 2 5 
SAF - - - - - - - - - 3 1 4 
SWE 2 1 - - - - - - - - 2 5 
UK 1 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 3 - - 17 
USA 2 10 3 2 3 3 0 2 6 9 2 42 
OEC - 1 5 - - 3 2 1 1 2 3 18 
ONEC - 2 - - - - 1 - - 2 1 6 
Total 5 19 12 5 6 8 5 6 11 26 11 114 
Source: own calculations 
AUS – Australia; CAN – Canada; FRA – France; GER – Germany; IRE - Ireland; ITA – Italy; NET 
– The Netherlands; SAF – South Africa; SPA – Spain; SWE – Sweden; SWI – Switzerland; UK - 
United Kingdom; USA - United States; OEC – Other European countries including (i) target firms 
from countries such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal and Switzerland and (ii) bidder countries such as, Austria, Belgium, Gibraltar, 
Greece, Lithuania, Luxemburg and Norway; ONEC – Other Non-European Countries such as Chile, 
China, Israel, Japan and Philippines. 
 
 
3.2.3 Year of Announcement 
The CBA sample is clearly concentrated over the period between 2005 and 2008 
(particularly during 2007). Over this time period the total transaction value of CBA 
accounts for approximately 330 billion dollars which represents more than 84% of all 
CBA in this 10-year period (see Figure 3). Additionally, the number of deals during 
these years (74) represents 65% of total sample and the mean transaction value during 
the same period was 54% higher than the mean value for the all period.  
As expected after 2008 there was a slow-down of CBA activity by European 
firms, nonetheless the number of CBA exceeds those announced between 2001 and 
2003. Cross-border acquisitions of European firms have presented a sharper fall than 
firms from overseas. The CBA activity behavior is consistent with the findings of 
Eckbo (2010) that states that waves generally start in the periods of economic growth 
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and credit expansion, being the peak usually associated with high bid premiums, and 
then finish at the beginning of recession. 
 
Figure 3 – Number of Transactions by Bid Announcement Year 
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Source: own calculations. 
  
3.2.4 Industry Sector 
Table 3 shows the industry of both the bidders and target firms. Although the 
sample of CBA is very heterogeneous, most bidder firms come from industries such as 
industrials (19%), healthcare (18%) and information technology (16%). European 
targets operate mainly in information technology (29%), industrials (20%), and 
materials (14%) industries, while non-European targets were from healthcare (24%), IT 
(19%) and industrials (14%) industries. The sample is consistent with the findings of 
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) that most cross-border deals occur in R&D intensive 
industries. Finally, as shown in Table 3 most CBA involved firms of same industry 
sector (90 out of 114 CBA) suggesting that most acquisitions were driven by business 
expansion and growth goals, as opposed to diversification strategies. 
. 
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Table 3 – Number of Transactions by Industry Sector  
 
 
Target firms  Bidder firms 
 
European   Non-European  
   
Industry  Nr. %  Nr. %  Nr. % 
Consumer Discretionary  8 16  7 11  16 14 
Consumer Staples  6 12  6 10  10 9 
Energy  0 0  6 10  6 5 
Healthcare  5 10  15 24  20 18 
Industrials  10 20  9 14  22 19 
Information Technology  10 20  12 19  18 16 
Materials  8 16  6 10  13 11 
Telecommunication Services  3 6  1 2  5 4 
Utilities  1 2  1 2  2 2 
Total 51   63   114  
Source: own calculations. 
 
3.2.5 Transaction Value  
As shown in Table 4 the average transaction value was 3.4 billion dollars. 
However, the average transaction value is higher cases where the target firm is from 
United States, Canada or other European country (around 3.7 billion dollar) whereas the 
transaction value of firms from other regions is lower than 1.5 billion dollars.  
 
Table 4 – Transaction Value by Target Region 
 
Transaction  
Value 
Target Region 
Europe United 
States and 
Canada 
Asia/ 
Pacific 
Latin 
America and 
Caribbean 
Africa/ 
Middle 
East 
Total 
Total  196,500 185,510 5,111 1,446 1,606 390,174 
Mean  3,853 3,710 730 1,446 321 3,423 
Maximum  29,101 61,050 3,064 1,446 805 61,050 
Minimum  20 14 7 1,446 18 7 
St. Dev. 6,378 9,369 1,088 N/A 338 7,698 
Source: own calculations. St. dev stands for standard deviation 
Transaction values in millions of US dollars. 
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Test Statistics  
In order to assess the short-term impact of European cross-border acquisition in 
shareholders wealth an event study has been performed based on the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAAR) around the announcement day. For that purpose, the CAAR 
has been computed within a short event window around the bid announcement day and 
then tested on its statistical significance.  
The event study analysis has been carried through the following steps: (i) 
determination of event date that, in this case, is the bid announcement day (t = 0); (ii) 
definition of event window and (iii) computation of CAAR. The event window has a 
maximum length of 11 days starting five days prior and goes up to five days after the 
bid announcement day (following Bradley et al., 1988; Lang et al. 1989; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2011) to capture short-term effect of CBA announcement.  
The CAAR gives the impact of the bid announcement in shareholders wealth 
and is defined as:  
N
CAR
CAAR
N
i
i∑
=
=
1
                      (1) 
N represents the number of firm and the cumulative abnormal return of shares of 
firm i at a certain event window (CARi) represents the sum of daily abnormal return of 
shares of for a certain firm i during an event window (ARi) that is computed as: 
 
∑
=
=
T
t
tii ARCAR
1
,
                           (2) 
The daily abnormal return of shares of firm i at day t (ARi,t) is calculated as: 
 
)(
,,, tititi RERAR −=                       (3) 
Where Ri,t is the realized return of shares of firm i at day t and E(Ri,t) is the 
expected return of shares of firm i at day t. The expected returns on shares were 
estimated based on market model and following Brown and Warner (1985) that 
concluded that although the market model (see equation 4) is a straightforward 
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procedure leads to results in estimation of abnormal return (AR) as good as, other more 
complex models. 
titmiiti eRR ,., ++= βα                  (4) 
where: 
Ri,t – return of the share of the firm i on day t, t = -5,…,5;; 
Rm,t – return of the market index MSCI World at day t, t = -5,…,5; 
β i – measure of the sensibility of the volatility of shares of firm i towards the market volatility 
(given by MSCI World Index); 
α i – measure of the average return of shares of firm i independent of market return during the 
moment t; 
ei,t – stochastic error, ∑ tie , = 0. 
 
Market model as proposed by Fama (1976) assumes that the expected return on a 
firm share is linearly related to the market return and to other factors not related with 
market return. In this dissertation it is assumed that the effect of the event, the 
announcement bid, is not fully captured by the expected returns obtained through 
market model, so any difference between the actual return and the expected return is 
assumed to be the effect of the announcement bid. 
The parameters α  and β  were estimated using market returns (MSCI – World 
Index as proxy) and realized share returns over the pre-event period. The estimation 
window starts in the month previous the bid announcement month and goes up to 60 
months prior bid announcement (from month=-1 to month =-60). It is assumed that the 
model parameters are constant throughout event window and estimation period. 
The log difference in MSCI – World Index is used as proxy of the market return: 
 
)ln()ln( 1,,, −−= smsmsm PPR              (5) 
where: 
Pm,s – MSCI World index value at month s , s=-1, …,-60; 
Pm,s-1 – MSCI World index value at month s-1, s=-1, …, -60; 
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Given that the CAAR gives the impact of the bid announcement in shareholders 
wealth, if the null hypothesis (H0:  CAAR = 0) is rejected we may conclude that bid 
announcement has an impact in shareholders wealth. 
It is assumed that CAAR follows a normal distribution ~ N (0, σ) and since the 
goal is to test whether CAAR equals zero, the test statistics follows a T-student 
distribution, as proposed by Brown and Warner (1985): 
)(CARS
CAAR
t stat =                                (6) 
∑
=
−
−
=
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i CAARCARN
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1
2 )(
1
1)(             (7)  
where: 
tstat - t-student test statistic with n-2 degrees of freedom; 
CAAR - Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns; 
S(CAR) - Sample standard deviation of CAR, which is the best unbiased estimator of standard 
deviation of population (σ); 
CARi – Cumulative Abnormal Return of firm i,  i = 1,...,N 
N = Total number of firms.  
 
Moreover, the analysis has been performed either for bidders, targets and 
combined paired match of both firms shares to assess the differences that bid 
announcement has in all firms involved in the transaction. 
The total return for combined pair of bidders and targets shares is computed 
following Goergen et al. (2004) and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000): 
 
BidderetT
BidderBidderetTetT
Combined
MVMV
MVCAARMVCAARCAAR
+
+
=
arg
argarg
**
     (8) 
where: 
CAARCombined – CAAR of combined sample of bidders and targets; 
CAARTarget –Targets CAAR; 
CAARBidder – Bidders CAAR; 
MVTarget – Market capitalization of portfolio of targets 6 months prior the beginning of event 
window; 
MVBidder – Market capitalization of portfolio of bidders 6 months prior the beginning of event 
window. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Short-Term Effects of Bid Announcement 
This section presents the effects of bid announcement in targets, bidders and 
combined firms shares over the following event windows: [-1;0], [-1;+1], [0;0], [-5;0], 
[-5;+1] and [-5;+5]. The results of the tests of sample split by means of payment and 
deal attitude are not presented because the sample is dominated by all-cash (85.96%) 
and friendly (95.61%) acquisitions so the conclusions would be very similar to the ones 
presented in following section 4.1.1. 
 
4.1.1 Abnormal Returns by Target Region 
As shown in Table 5, target shareholders experience, on average, positive wealth 
gains while bidder shareholders, generally, present wealth losses around bid 
announcement day. These results suggest that the market does not expect the bid to 
benefit bidder shareholders. The combined effect is positive though statistical 
significance is not found in the case where the target is a non-European firm. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the bid announcement has positive effect on target 
shareholders wealth in all event windows. The target shareholders CAAR[-5;+5] is higher 
than the one observed by Martynova and Renneboog (2011) for European CBA 
(12.17%), however it is lower than the one reported by Eun et al. (1996)  for CBA of 
US targets (37.02%). The results also show that the CAAR[-1;+1] of target shareholders 
equal to 17.55% is higher than the one observed in Campa and Hernando (2004) and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2011) of, 4.08% and 11.52%, respectively. The CAAR[-1; 0] 
of 12.33% is also higher than the 11.25% reported by Goergen and Renneboog (2004). 
The results also show that CBA of non-European target firms provide a higher 
abnormal return to target shareholders, which means that bids to overseas firms priced 
larger premiums. Assuming that the acquisition of European firms by European firms 
may be similar to domestic M&A due to harmonized framework of corporate law and 
monetary policy, these results suggest that cross-border acquisitions provide higher 
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returns than domestic deals, confirming evidence from Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
but not from Martynova and Renneboog (2011) nor Moeller et al. (2005).  
 
Table 5 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Target Region 
This Table shows the cumulative abnormal returns measured over several event windows 
for targets, bidders as well as combined paired sample by target region. 
Event window 
(days) 
Total 
Sample 
European 
Targets 
Non-European  
Targets 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR 
(%) 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR 
(%) 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR 
(%) 
Panel A: Targets  
[-1 ; 0] 12.33***  71.93   9.26***  68.63 14.81***  74.60 
[ 0 ; 0 ] 11.08***  71.93   8.42***  72.55 13.23***  71.43 
[-1;+1] 17.55***  78.07 12.23***  70.59 21.86***  84.13 
[-5 ; 0] 14.20***  72.81 12.23***  74.51 15.80***  71.43 
[-5;+1] 19.43***  75.44 15.20***  70.59 22.85***  79.37 
[-5;+5] 18.87***  66.67 15.34***  64.71 21.72***  68.25 
Observations 114  51  63  
Panel B: Bidders 
[-1 ; 0]  -0.82*  40.35 -0.15  41.18  -1.36**  39.68 
[ 0 ; 0 ]  -0.15  42.98  0.49  45.10  -0.67  41.27 
[-1;+1]  -0.43     40.35  0.16  37.25  -0.91  42.86 
[-5 ; 0]  -2.90***  31.58   -2.62*  23.53  -3.12**  38.10 
[-5;+1]  -2.51**  33.33   -2.32      25.49  -2.67*  39.68 
[-5;+5]  -4.73***  31.58   -5.79**  27.45  -3.87  34.92 
Observations   114       51    63  
Panel C: Combined  
[-1 ; 0]   1.50**  52.63  3.19***  62.75   0.13  95.24 
[ 0 ; 0 ]   1.88***  55.26  3.30***  66.67   0.72 100.00 
[-1;+1]   2.61***  51.75  4.95***  54.90   0.71  93.65 
[-5 ; 0]   0.66  47.37  1.87  49.02  -1.27  85.71 
[-5;+1]   1.77  47.37  4.82**  43.14  -0.69  85.71 
[-5;+5]   0.18  41.23  2.61  41.18  -1.80  74.60 
Observations   114   51    63  
Source: own calculations.  
t-statistic follows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level for a 
two-tailed test.  
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Contrary to targets scenario, Panel B of Table 5 shows that CBA announcement 
causes short-term negative effect on the wealth of bidder shareholders. The negative 
performance of bidder shares is worse in longer windows, which is consistent with Eun 
et al. (1996). The losses of bidder shareholders around announcement suggest that 
market does not expect CBA to generate value to bidder shareholders.  
At announcement day, bidder shares present a negative CAAR of 0.15%, which 
is opposite to positive CAAR of 0.39% found by Martynova and Renneboog (2011). 
Our results also document statistically negative CAAR[-1;0] of -0.82% in bidder shares 
which is also opposite to the results found by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) that 
report a positive and significant CAAR of 2.38% for European bidders. In the longest 
event window ([-5;+5]) the CAAR of bidder shareholders remains negative and 
statistically significant (-4.73%). This result is consistent with Eun et al. (1996) that 
find that the cross-border acquisition of US targets cause wealth destruction for bidder 
shareholders. The results also show that CBA of non-European firms motivate higher 
losses for bidder shareholders than those of European firms. These results suggest that 
bidder firms pay larger premiums to acquire non-European firms.   
While CBA of European firms provide a positive and statistically significant 
combined (bidder and target firms) effect, the same does not happen in the case of CBA 
of non-European target firms, where the CAAR is positive (less than 1%) but not 
statistically significant. The statistical significant positive effect of CBA announcement 
on combined shareholders wealth suggests that the bidders losses are offset by targets 
gains. Nevertheless, our evidence is contrary to Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) that 
report a negative and statistically significant combined CAAR[-1;+1]. 
 
4.1.2 Abnormal Returns by Period of Bid Announcement 
Table 6 shows the results of bid announcement effect before and after the 
financial crisis of 2008. 
As shown in Table 6, the main conclusions on targets and bidders gains around 
announcement remain the same. The bid announcement effect on target shares is once 
more, strongly positive, although higher in post-2008 period. Providing that the sample 
is composed only by closed or effective CBA, the results show that target shareholders 
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earn larger abnormal returns in stages of economic and financial constraints transactions 
suggesting they retain more benefits in period of economic crisis than other periods. 
 
Table 6 – Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Bid Announcement Period 
This Table shows the cumulative abnormal returns measured over several event 
windows for targets, bidders as well as combined paired sample, by period of bid 
announcement (pre-2008, post-2008). 
Event window (days) Pre-2008 Post-2008 
 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR (%) 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR (%) 
Panel A: Targets 
 
[-1 ; 0] 10.55*** 69.05 17.31*** 80.00 
[ 0 ; 0]  9.34*** 69.05 15.96*** 80.00 
[-1;+1] 16.50*** 76.19 20.51*** 83.33 
[-5 ; 0] 11.19*** 69.05 22.65*** 83.33 
[-5;+1] 17.14*** 70.24 25.85*** 90.00 
[-5;+5] 16.62*** 63.10 25.17*** 76.67 
Observations 84  30  
Panel B: Bidders 
 
[-1 ; 0]  -0.90* 42.86  -0.60 33.33 
[ 0 ; 0]  -0.36 45.24   0.42 36.67 
[-1;+1]  -0.60 40.48   0.05 40.00 
[-5 ; 0]  -3.10*** 32.14  -2.33 30.00 
[-5;+1]  -2.81** 34.52  -1.68 30.00 
[-5;+5]  -4.89*** 35.71  -4.29 20.00 
Observations   84    30  
Panel C: Combined 
[-1 ; 0]   1.59** 54.76   1.25 46.67 
[ 0 ; 0]   1.80*** 55.95   2.08 53.33 
[-1;+1]   2.43** 54.76   3.10 43.33 
[-5 ; 0]   0.42 50.00   1.34 40.00 
[-5;+1]   1.27 50.00   3.19 40.00 
[-5;+5]  -0.42 42.86  1.85 36.67 
Observations   84   30  
Source: own calculation. 
t-statistic follows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level for a two-tailed test. The Post-2008 period includes the period from 2008 (including) to 
2010. 
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In terms of bidder shareholders our evidence only shows a significant and 
negative CAAR in longer windows in pre-2008 period where bidder shareholders face 
greater losses, which may suggest that in pre-crisis period bidders pay large premiums 
for targets. The CBA undertook before 2008 present positive combined wealth effect, 
although only statistically significant for shorter windows. For CBA launched on or 
after 2008, although the combine effect is still positive, it is not statistically significance 
in any time window. 
 
4.1.3 Abnormal Returns by Industry Relatedness 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that in shorter event windows target firms 
shareholders experience higher CAAR in CBA between firms from different industry 
than in those from same industry which is consistent with previous evidence from by 
Martynova and Renneboog (2011).   However, for lengthen event windows ([-5;0] and 
[-5;+5]) CBA within same industry are more profitable for shareholders of target firms.  
Panel B of Table 7 shows that bidder shareholders tend to lose more in CBA 
between firms from the same industries than from different industries. For longer event 
windows CBA involving firms from the same industries have a significant negative 
impact in the bidder shareholders wealth. The effect on bidder shareholders wealth is 
negative but not significant in case of CBA between firms operating in different 
industries.   
Panel C of Table 7 shows that CBA between firms from the same industries 
have higher and positive combined wealth effect, although only statistically significant 
in shortest windows around announcement day. 
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Table 7 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Industry Relatedness 
This Table shows the cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for 
targets, bidders as well as combined paired sample by industry code (different 
industry, same industry). 
Event window (days) Different industry Same industry 
 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR (%) 
CAAR  
(%) 
Positive 
CAR (%) 
Panel A: Targets  
 
[-1 ; 0] 13.49*** 62.50 12.02*** 74.44 
[ 0 ; 0] 14.50*** 66.67 10.17*** 73.33 
[-1;+1] 19.10*** 83.33 17.14*** 76.67 
[-5 ; 0] 12.48*** 70.83 14.66*** 73.33 
[-5;+1] 18.09*** 75.00 19.79*** 75.56 
[-5;+5] 15.10*** 66.67 19.87*** 66.67 
Observations 24  90  
Panel B: Bidders  
 
[-1 ; 0]  -1.09 54.17  -0.75 36.67 
[ 0 ; 0]  -0.84 41.67   0.03 43.33 
[-1;+1]  -0.92 41.67  -0.30 40.00 
[-5 ; 0]  -2.56 50.00  -2.99** 26.67 
[-5;+1]  -2.39 45.83  -2.55* 30.00 
[-5;+5]  -3.37 45.83  -5.09** 27.78 
Observations   24  90  
Panel C: Combined 
[-1 ; 0]   0.67 54.17  1.72** 52.22 
[ 0 ; 0]   1.23 66.67  2.05*** 52.22 
[-1;+1]   0.82 50.00  3.09*** 52.22 
[-5 ; 0]  -0.63 66.67  1.01 42.22 
[-5;+1]  -0.47 58.33  2.37 44.44 
[-5;+5]  -1.94 50.00  0.74 38.89 
Observations   24   90  
Source: own calculation 
t-statistics follows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level for a two-tailed test.  
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4.1.4 Abnormal Returns by Relative Size 
In this section the bid announcement effect is tested according to the relative 
size. The market capitalization of the firms six month before the bid announcement was 
used as proxy of the relative size, as per Asquith et al. (1983) and Agrawal et al. (1992).  
 
Table 8 – Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Relative Size 
This Table shows the cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for 
targets, bidders as well as combined paired sample by relative size (proportion of 
market capitalization of target firm over market capitalization of bidder firm). 
Event window 
(days) 
≧ 10% 
 (Relatively Small Bidders,  
Large Targets) 
<10% 
(Relatively Large Bidders,  
Small Targets) 
 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR (%) 
CAAR 
(%) 
Positive 
CAR (%) 
Panel A: Targets  
[-1 ; 0] 11.69*** 70.21 12.77*** 73.13 
[ 0 ; 0 ] 10.95*** 76.60 11.17*** 68.66 
[-1;+1] 14.93*** 80.85 19.40*** 76.12 
[-5 ; 0] 13.74*** 76.60 14.53*** 70.15 
[-5;+1] 16.97*** 76.60 21.16*** 74.63 
[-5;+5] 15.53*** 65.96 21.21*** 67.16 
Observations 47  67  
Panel B: Bidders  
[-1 ; 0]  -1.41* 36.17  -0.41 43.28 
[ 0 ; 0 ]  -0.53 48.94   0.11 38.81 
[-1;+1]  -1.36 38.30   0.22 41.79 
[-5 ; 0]  -4.94*** 23.40  -1.47 37.31 
[-5;+1]  -4.89*** 23.40  -0.84 40.30 
[-5;+5]  -9.01*** 21.28  -1.73 38.81 
Observations   47    67  
Panel C: Combined 
[-1 ; 0]  3.81*** 59.57  -0.12 59.57 
[ 0 ; 0 ]  4.02*** 65.96   0.37 65.96 
[-1;+1]  5.48*** 63.83   0.59 63.83 
[-5 ; 0]  3.19** 57.45  -1.11 57.45 
[-5;+1]  4.86** 53.19  -0.39 53.19 
[-5;+5]  2.18 42.55  -1.23 42.55 
Observations  47    67  
Source: own calculation.  
t-statistics follows a t-student distribution. ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level for a two-tailed test. 
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The results presented in Table 8 show that for relative small bidders, i.e., the 
case the target market capitalization represents more than 10% of the bidder market 
capitalization, the CAAR is positive for target shares, negative for bidder shares and the 
combined effect is also positive and statically significant in longer event windows. 
These results suggest that the abnormal returns of target shares have compensated the 
negative abnormal returns of bidder shares. In case of relative large bidders (the target 
represents less than 10% of the bidder market capitalization), although the effect on 
target shareholders is still positive and statistically significant, the effect on bidder 
shareholders and the combined effect are not statistically different from zero.  
Panel A of Table 8 shows that in cross-borders acquisitions shareholders of 
small target firm experience larger wealth creation than shareholders of large target 
firms.  
Panel C of Table 8 shows that in CBA of relative larger targets, the combined 
effect of bid announcement is positive and significant which means that the losses 
observed in bidder shares are completely offset by the gains on target shares. It may also 
suggest that bidders offered too high premiums and there was a distribution of wealth 
from bidders to targets. In CBA of relative large bidders, the combined wealth effect is 
negative but not statistically significant.  
 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
After the comprehensive assay of the firms CAAR in several sub-samples for 
assessing the value created/destroyed in CBA transactions a step further will be taken in 
the analysis of variables that may impact the CAAR of bidder and target shares in order 
to allow us to have a better understanding under what circumstances the bidder firms 
overpay and target shareholders present larger gains. 
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4.2.1 The Model 
The impact of all variables on bidders and targets CAR was tested, by running 
the following regression5: 
 
+++++=
+− iiiii
ATTITSIZELNINDUSTPAYCAR 4321)5;5 )(( ββββα  
                     iiii INVPROEXRCNTR εβββ ++++ 765  
 
The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of bidders 
(targets) shares within the event window [-5;+5]6 around announcement day and the 
explanatory (exogenous) variables are presented in Table 9  
The exogenous variables can be split in two groups, the cross-border variables 
(target country status of development, relative exchange rate and level of investor 
protection in target country) and the bid characteristics variables (means of payment, 
industry relatedness, relative size and bid attitude) which will be considered separately 
and together.   
Regarding the cross-border variables the variable PAY is used to test the 
hypothesis of means of payment, that is to say if bidder and target shares tend to have 
better performance in all-cash or other type of offers around announcement date. 
Therefore if all-cash offers have better impact on shares price change than equity and 
mixed offers, this variable should have a positive sign. The variable INDUST is used to 
capture the effect of focus and diversification goals of cross-border bids on bidders and 
targets shares and so if acquisitions within same industry sector are better for 
shareholders than acquisitions of firms in different industries this variable should have 
associated a positive coefficient. The variable ATTIT tests whether hostile bids provide 
better returns to bidder and target shareholders than friendly ones. If true the coefficient 
associated to this variable should assume a negative value.  SIZE explanatory variable is 
used to test if the relative size of both firms involved has an impact on shares CAR 
around announcement. This variable is composed by the linear logarithm of target 
                                                     
5
 The regression has been run using White (1980) procedure for purposes of control of heteroskedasticity. 
6
 The regression has also been conducted for [-1;+1] and [-1;0] windows, nonetheless the results obtained 
were not statistically significant in the case of the bidders (which  may be a sign that the bids were, on 
average, foreseen by the market) and were similar to the results of  the CAR regression over [-5;+5] 
window in the case of the targets and so, for purposes of brevity, the results are not reported .  
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firms’ market capitalization of target firm in relation to the bidders market 
capitalization, following Asquith et al. (1983) and Jarrel and Poulsen (1989).  For 
instances, if acquisitions of relative large targets provide better CAR for bidder 
shareholders around announcement, this variable should have a positive sign. 
 
Table 9 – Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
CAR Cumulative Average Returns of bidders/targets shares within event 
window around announcement day. 
PAY A zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bid is all cash paid and 0 otherwise (equity or mixed) 
INDUST A zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if involving firms 
operate in the same industry sector and 0 otherwise. 
ATTIT A zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 in case of a friendly bid and 0 otherwise (hostile or hostile to friendly). 
SIZE The ratio between target and bidder market capitalization six months prior the bid announcement. 
CNTR A zero-one dummy variable taking the value 1 if target is from a less developed country and 0 otherwise (see details in Appendix I) 
EXR 
The ratio of the difference between the yearly average exchange rate 
of target home currency (units of target home currency per unit of 
bidder home currency) and the exchange rate of target currency in 
the announcement year divided by the average exchange rate of the 
target relative to the bidder in the 2001-2010 period. 
INVPRO 
A zero-one dummy variable measuring the level of investor 
protection of target country. It takes 1 if target is from a country with 
strong or medium investor protection and 0 otherwise. It follows 
classification of “Strong”, “Medium” and “Weak”, as per Anderson 
et al., 2009 (see details in Appendix I). 
 
Regarding the cross-border variables, the variable CNTR is a dummy one-zero 
variable (following Doukas and Travlos, 1988) that is meant to capture the degree of 
economic development of the target firm country. If CNTR assumes a positive value it 
means that CBA of firms from less developed countries have larger impact on the short-
term performance of bidders and targets shares than CBA of firms from other countries. 
EXR variable is meant to capture the effect of exchange rates on the shares CAR, as 
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previously tested by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Cebenoyan et al. (1992) and Eun et 
al. (1996). In case the EXR assumes a negative (positive) value, it means that the target 
firms currency is cheaper (expensive) for the European bidder firm in the announcement 
year than in average sample period. INVPRO variable is used to test whether the level 
of investor protection has an impact on the performance of the firm shares. If INVPRO 
assumes a negative value it means that CBA of target firms from countries with low 
investor protection have greater impact on the CAR of bidder and target shares than 
acquisitions of firms from countries with stronger market regulation7.  
 
4.2.2 Results of Cross-Sectional Analysis 
The following sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2 present the results of the regressions 
of bidders and targets CAR[-5;+5]. 
 
4.2.2.1 Bidders 
The results presented in Table 10 show that only the relative size and the level of 
investor protection of target shareholders have statistical significant power to explain 
bidders CAR.   
Surprisingly, the results show that the relative size of the target has a negative 
effect on bidder shares CAR (statically significant at 5% level), which is contrary to the 
findings  of Asquith et al. (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) that support that the 
larger the relative size of the target the larger the improvement in the bidder shares 
CAR. 
Not consistent with Anderson et al. (2009) the results suggest that the strong or 
medium level of investor protection in the target firms country have a significant 
positive effect (at 10% level) over bidder shares CAR. Bidders do not take advantage 
from low investor protection in the target firms country, instead they benefit with high 
level of rules that protect target shareholders. A possible reason for it is that cross-
border acquisitions of targets from countries with strong shareholder protection (usually 
more developed countries) may represent less risky investments to bidder firms. 
                                                     
7
 For a more detailed analysis of the exogenous variables, the Pearson correlation between the exogenous 
variables can be found in Appendix II. 
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Another explanation is related to the  sample composition of closed and effective deals, 
excluding therefore all cross-border bids launched over the same period of analysis that 
were not completed until 2012.  
 
Table 10 –Regressions of Bidders CAR 
This table shows the effect of a set of variables on bidder shares CARi[-5;+5]. 
Variable Coefficient  
      (1)      (2)      (3) 
PAY 
  -0.090  -0.073 
 
  (0.076)  (0.067) 
INDUST 
  -0.022  -0.010 
 
  (0.039)   (0.039) 
LN(SIZE) 
  -0.010**  -0.010** 
 
  (0.018)  (0.004) 
ATTIT 
   0.004  -0.026 
 
  (0.046)  (0.058) 
CNTR 
  0.076    0.046 
 
 (0.082)   (0.087) 
EXR 
  0.305    0.267 
 
 (0.194)   (0.173) 
INVPRO 
  0.079*    0.077* 
 
 (0.044)   (0.044) 
Constant 
 -0.109***   0.059  -0.045 
 
 (0.039)  (0.094)  (0.100) 
    
Observations   114   114   114 
R-squared   0.066   0.080   0.134 
Adjusted R-squared   0.040   0.047   0.077 
F-statistic   2.582   2.380   2.352 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.057   0.056   0.028 
Source: own calculations. Standard deviation is presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes 
for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Regression (1) presents the impact of cross-border 
variables in Bidder CAR[-5;+5]. Regression (2) presents the effect of firm and bid 
characteristics in Bidder CAR[-5;+5]. Regression (3) presents the effect of both cross-border 
and well as firm and bid characteristics in Bidder CAR[-5;+5]. 
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4.2.2.2 Targets 
The results presented in Table 11 show that the means of exchange, the attitude 
towards the bid, the relative exchange rate and the level of investor protection have an 
impact in target shares CAR.   
The variable of means of payment is statistical significant only in the regression 
(1) where just cross-border variables are considered. The high correlation between the 
means of payment variable and the relative exchange rate variable (see Appendix II) 
may be the reason why the first one loses statistical significance in regression (3) in 
which all variables are included. Consistent to previous evidence from Harris et al. 
(1991) and Martynova and Renneboog (2011) the results suggest that target 
shareholders present higher gains in all-cash acquisitions rather than in equity ones. 
Table 11 also shows that the coefficient of the bid attitude variable has a positive 
sign which is statistically significant at 1%. It suggests that targets earn larger abnormal 
returns on friendly acquisitions which is not consistent to previous results of Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) and Servaes (1991). One possible reason is the uncertainty 
surrounding targets value, especially in cross-border acquisitions may lead bidders to 
launch a higher price in friendly acquisitions in order to facilitate the post-acquisition 
process. Nonetheless the statistical significance of the bid attitude variable, the result 
shall only concern to friendly acquisitions since 97% of the sample is composed by this 
type of deals. 
The results also show that the relative exchange rate impacts (significant at 1%) 
the targets CAR. Consistent to Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) the results show that the 
bidders home currency is relatively stronger than targets home currency in the 
announcement year. 
The variable of level of investor protection in target country is found to be 
statistical significant to explain not only bidders but also targets CAR. The variable 
coefficient has a positive sign, suggesting that targets shares present higher gains when 
targets are from countries with strong level of investor protection. A higher protection 
of target shareholders represents more negotiation power which may lead to higher 
price paid for target shares. 
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Table 11 – Regressions of Targets CAR 
This table shows the effect of a set of variables on target shares CARi[-5;+5]. 
Variable Coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) 
PAY      0.126*   0.085  
     (0.074)  (0.073)  
LN(SIZE)     -0.014  -0.016  
     (0.010)  (0.010)  
INDUST      0.050   0.053  
     (0.073) 
 
 (0.069)  
ATTIT      0.211***   0.253*** 
     (0.079)  (0.090)  
EXR   -0.730***   -0.656*** 
   (0.242)   (0.248)  
CNTR   -0.132   -0.188  
    (0.139)   (0.140)  
INVPRO     0.109*    0.117* 
    (0.061)   (0.063)  
Constant     0.107**   -0.209  -0.309* 
    (0.047)   (0.139)  (0.168)  
Observations     114      114   114 
R-squared     0.099     0.050   0.152  
Adjusted R-squared     0.074     0.015   0.096  
F-statistic     4.008     1.421   3.000  
Prob(F-statistic)     0.009     0.232   0.013  
Source: own calculations. Standard deviation is presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes for 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Regression (1) presents the impact of cross-border 
variables in Target CAR[-5;+5]. Regression (2) presents the effect of firm and bid characteristics 
in Target CAR[-5;+5]. Regression (3) presents the effect of both cross-border and well as firm 
and bid characteristics in Target CAR[-5;+5]. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This research addresses an important recent phenomenon in world economy, 
particularly, in M&A market which is the firms internationalization trough cross-border 
acquisitions. The main goals of this dissertation are to conclude whether CBA create or 
destroy value and which variables can better explain it.  
The sample comprises 114 cross-border deals launched by European firms 
between 2001 and 2010. The sample is highly concentrated in the period from 2005 to 
2008 (65% of total sample) and is mostly composed by friendly and all-cash deals.  
The results confirm positive wealth effect for shareholders of target firms in all 
event windows around announcement day. Plus, target shareholders present higher 
abnormal returns in CBA of non-European than in acquisitions of European firms, 
which may be consistent to prior literature that finds that cross-border acquisitions 
provide higher returns than domestic deals 
In case of bidders, the results of this study show that the shares have a negative 
performance around bid announcement day, suggesting that bidder shareholders loose 
wealth from the acquisition. Although the negative abnormal returns experienced by 
bidder shareholders, the performance of combined shares is positive which suggests that 
the targets gains surpassed the bidders losses. The results evidence that the acquisition 
of European firms generates value since the total wealth effect is positive and 
statistically significant. However in case of CBA of non-European firms the results do 
not confirm that CBA have positive combined wealth effect.  
This dissertation also shows that in the post-2008 target shares present larger 
gains than in preceding period suggesting that targets benefit from economic crisis.  
In terms of industry relatedness, the results show that target shares always 
present gains while bidder shares have larger significant losses in acquisitions involving 
firms from the same business area. It suggests that focus strategy not only has not lead 
to short-term benefits to bidder shareholders but instead has caused them wealth 
destruction.   
As expected, the results also show that target shareholders earn more in CBA by 
relative large bidders and the combined gains are positive but only are statistical 
significant in acquisitions made by relative small bidders.  
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Finally, our analysis also shows that the relative size and the level of investor 
protection impact bidder shares CAR. However, the results show that the relative small 
size of bidder firms has negative impact on bidder shares performance around 
announcement day. In addition, our findings also suggest that the level of investor 
protection has a positive impact on bidder shares CAR, that is to say, CBA of target 
firms from countries with strong and medium level of investor protection have a 
positive effect on bidder shares performance. The stronger level of investor protection 
also has a positive impact on target gains suggesting that the target firms shareholders 
from countries with severe regulation benefit more from CBA than shareholders from 
countries with weaker regulation. The analysis of targets CAR suggests that a stronger 
bidder home currency also impacts targets CAR.  
To sum up, the analysis of European cross-border acquisitions undertaken 
between 2001 and 2010 shows that target shareholders tend to earn positive abnormal 
returns while bidder shareholders tend to lose wealth. However the combined short-term 
wealth effect is found to be positive around the announcement day, thus suggesting that 
bidders overpaid and that there is a wealth transfer from bidders to targets shareholders. 
Variables such as the relative size and the level of investor protection are found to have 
an impact on bidders CAR. On other hand, variables such as the relative exchange rate 
and the level of investor protect are suggested to explain the CAR of target shares. 
Further research may consist on a comparative analysis of conclusions presented 
here on CBA with domestic M&A. Additional research on features and events that took 
place before and after the bid are also important to the analysis on CBA performance 
and its determinants. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I - Status of Development and Level of Investor Protection  
in Target Country 
Target Country Target Country Status of Development 
Target Country Level of 
Investor Protection 
Australia Developed Strong 
Austria Developed Medium 
Belgium Developed Weak 
Canada Developed Strong 
Chile Non-developed Weak 
China Non-developed Strong 
Cyprus Non-developed Weak 
Czech Republic Developed Weak 
Finland Developed Strong 
France Developed Weak 
Germany Developed Medium 
Hungary Developed Weak 
Israel Developed Weak 
Italy Developed Weak 
Japan Developed Strong 
Netherlands Developed Weak 
Norway Developed Medium 
Philipppines Non-developed Weak 
Poland Developed Weak 
Portugal Developed Weak 
South Africa Non-developed Weak 
Spain Developed Weak 
Sweden  Developed Strong 
Switzerland Developed Medium 
United Kingdom Developed Strong 
United States Developed Strong 
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Appendix II - Correlation Matrix between Exogenous Variables  
 
 PAY INDUST SIZE ATTIT CNTR EXR INVPRO 
PAY   1.000  -0.023   0.061  -0.066   0.012  -0.199   0.013 
INDUST  -0.023   1.000   0.011  -0.085   0.058  -0.084  -0.085 
SIZE   0.061   0.011   1.000   0.000  -0.204   0.033   0.074 
ATTIT  -0.066  -0.085   0.000   1.000   0.045   0.012  -0.092 
CNTR   0.012   0.058  -0.204   0.045   1.000  -0.043  -0.412 
EXR  -0.199  -0.084   0.033   0.012  -0.043   1.000   0.033 
INVPRO   0.013  -0.085   0.074  -0.092  -0.412  0.033   1.000 
 
